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INTRODUCTION
Like the U.S. Constitution, the European Convention on Human Rights
(“the Convention”) guarantees both the right to a fair trial and the right to the
assistance of counsel. The right to counsel has many dimensions, including
a state’s obligation to provide counsel to indigents, limits on state
interference with counsel, a definition of the stages at which counsel’s
assistance is required, and standards for the competency of counsel. The U.S.
Supreme Court has grappled with each of these dimensions, and right to
counsel cases are beginning to reach the European Court of Human Rights
(“ECtHR”). For instance, there are strong parallels between the ECtHR’s
decision in Salduz v. Turkey1 and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Miranda v. Arizona.2 Both decisions found that the trial court violated the
right to legal assistance and a fair trial by admitting a defendant’s statement
made in police custody in the absence of a lawyer.3
This paper offers a comparative exploration of the enforcement of the
right to counsel for indigent defendants in the United States of America and
the member states of the Council of Europe, with a special focus on the
structures established by the U.S. Constitution and the Convention. We ask
the following questions: What roles do the U.S. Supreme Court and the
ECtHR play as central courts in enforcing the right to counsel in the
sovereign states from which they hear cases? What mechanisms exist to
enforce the courts’ pronouncements? And to what extent has the evolution
of the right to counsel in each system been path dependent?
Although some version of a right to counsel has existed in the United
States for more than two centuries,4 the U.S. Constitution does not
specifically address the right to counsel in state criminal proceedings, and
the states have never explicitly agreed to a federal mandate providing
counsel in criminal cases.5 In fact, the federal constitutional right to the
1. Salduz v. Turkey, 2008-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 59.
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. Id. at 444–45; Salduz, 2008-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 83. Note, however, that the Miranda decision
grounded the right to counsel during custodial interrogation in the privilege against self-incrimination.
4. The Bill of Rights, ratified in 1791, guaranteed criminal defendants in federal trials “the
right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for [their] defense.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
5. Note, however, that there may be state constitutional rights to government-compensated
counsel. Some state constitutions address the matter explicitly in the text. The Louisiana Constitution
provides:
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assistance of state-provided counsel was not articulated by the Supreme
Court until the 1960s.6 It was founded on the general guarantee of Due
Process first made applicable to the states in 1868 at the conclusion of the
Civil War.7 Perhaps this institutional history helps to explain why the right,
though widely recognized as a critical part of the United States’ adversarial
legal system, has remained more of an ideal than a reality for many American
defendants. Criminal defense lawyers are both expensive and controversial,
and there has been no consistent political support for adequately funding
indigent defense.8 Many indigent defendants find themselves represented by
attorneys whose caseloads make effective representation impossible, and
U.S. courts lack the institutional tools to provide this funding.9
In contrast, the recognition of a European right10 to state-compensated
defense counsel is more recent, and also more explicit. It is the product of a
post-World War II international agreement that specifically guarantees a
publicly-funded right to counsel.11 The Convention that created the ECtHR
also established an enforcement mechanism that has been strengthened by
subsequent revision of the Convention, decisions of the ECtHR, and the

At each stage of the proceedings, every person is entitled to assistance of counsel of his choice,
or appointed by the court if he is indigent and charged with an offense punishable by
imprisonment. The legislature shall provide for a uniform system for securing and
compensating qualified counsel for indigents.
LA. CONST. art. I, § 13. In other states, the state supreme court has interpreted the state constitution to
provide a right to adequate state-provided counsel. See also Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 277 A.2d 216, 223
(1971) (holding that “as a matter of simple justice, no indigent defendant should be subjected to a
conviction entailing imprisonment in fact or other consequence of magnitude without first having had
due and fair opportunity to have counsel assigned without cost.”).
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra text accompanying note 50.
8. See infra Part II.B.4.
9. See infra Part II.B.1–3.
10. The Criminal Procedure codes of various European states provided for a right to counsel long
before the European Convention came into force. See, e.g., STRAFPROZEßORDNUNG [StPO] [CODE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] sec. 137(1) (Ger.): “The suspect/defendant may make use of the assistance of a
defense lawyer at any stage of the proceedings.” An English language translation of the German Code
provided by the German Ministry of Justice is available at https://urldefense.
proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.gesetze-2Dim-2Dinternet.de_englisch-5Fstpo_englisch5Fstpo.html-23p1126&d=CwIDaQ&c=imBPVzF25OnBgGmVOlcsiEgHoG1i6YHLR0Sj_gZ4adc&
r=GhcwAg0S9sZzdUmSU3EuAQ&m=G3DGH7NDY7rAP0Rz95j4lN_a94hqu4lft2VaA7lqtko&s=nE
CGADScrvnjT1Z7rqmf_IxwJytSqrDzaCrcUzKcv1I&e= [https://perma.cc/K366-TBY8].
11. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European
Convention on Human Rights) art. 6, ¶ (3)(c), Apr. 11, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (stating that anyone
charged with a criminal offense has the right “to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of
his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when
the interests of justice so require”).
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development of detailed administrative enforcement procedures that now
comprise the Strasbourg supervisory system.12
Although many U.S. scholars are skeptical of the efficacy of
international human rights treaties and courts,13 the Strasbourg system
created by the European Convention appears to offer several advantages over
the U.S. constitutional system, which has been plagued by the twin problems
of a lack of political will to provide sufficient funding for counsel and courts’
inability to address systemic, rather than individual, problems.14 The
Convention reflects the explicit—and relatively recent—political
commitment of each member state to publicly-funded counsel. And by
placing the responsibility for implementation of the ECtHR’s decisions in
the hands of a political body, the Committee of Ministers (“CoM”), the
Convention addresses—at least to some degree—the question of political
will. Moreover, the CoM and the Court itself have now developed a
repertoire of enforcement mechanisms that require member states to adopt
general or systemic remedies.
But despite the apparent promise of this institutional design and the
judicial and administrative developments we describe below, there are still
severe limits to what the ECtHR can accomplish. It has limited resources to
deal with a massive caseload15 and ultimately lacks the means to compel
recalcitrant member states to comply with the Convention short of expulsion
from the Council of Europe. Indeed member states themselves retain the
option of exiting from the Convention and the Council of Europe.16 In
contrast, after the seceding states lost the United States Civil War, the
Supreme Court held that the union was “indissoluble;” the states had no right
of exit.17
12. See infra Part III.B. The term Strasbourg refers to the location of the ECtHR in Strasbourg,
France, and the “Strasbourg system” refers to the collection of decisions by the Court combined with
decisions by the Committee of Ministers.
13. For a trenchant statement of this view, see generally ERIC A. POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2014).
14. See infra Part II.B.
15. See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
16. Statute of the Council of Europe, art. 7, May 5, 1949, 87 U.N.T.S. 103, 108. Greece withdrew
from the Council of Europe in 1970, but it was readmitted in 1974 following a change in regime. See
STATUTE OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, FULL LIST: CHART OF SIGNATURES AND RATIFICATIONS OF
TREATY 001, http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/001/signatures?
p_auth=O0WvDEB0 [https://perma.cc/6FT2-YR64] at n. 12 (last visited Oct. 11, 2016). Russia has
reportedly considered withdrawing. See, e.g., Ivan Nechepurenko, Council of Europe Exit to Cut Russia
Away From Europe, THE MOSCOW TIMES (Feb. 4, 2015, 8:38 PM), https://themoscowti
mes.com/news/council-of-europe-exit-to-cut-russia-away-from-europe-43568 [https://perma.cc/3TDNKZGS].
17. See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 700 (1869) (holding that the Constitution did not permit states
to unilaterally secede from the United States).
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We begin by contrasting the founding documents of the United States
and the Council of Europe. We then turn to a more detailed description of
each system’s current enforcement mechanisms and the outcomes for
defendants in the United States and Europe in relation to the state-funded
right to counsel.
I. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONVENTION
The framers of the U.S. Constitution did not focus directly on the
protection of individual rights, and the Constitution contained no provisions
requiring either the states or the new central government to provide counsel,
or even to afford individual defendants Due Process or a fair trial. Rather,
the framers relied on structural limitations to protect individual liberty by
limiting the power delegated to the new federal government and creating an
internal system of checks and balances.18 As adopted by the Constitutional
Convention, the proposed U.S. Constitution created the federal government;
divided its powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches;19
it also delegated to the new government only authority over enumerated
matters of national concern such as foreign affairs, the establishment of a
postal service, and the regulation of land, naval forces, and commerce.20 The
proposed Constitution vested all judicial power in the Supreme Court and
any lower federal courts that Congress chose to create.21 The Constitution
contained no guarantees of personal rights or freedoms, and indeed this
omission was one of the principal grounds of opposition to ratification.22 The
first ten amendments (known as the “Bill of Rights”) were added later to
address this concern and secure ratification.23 The Bill of Rights includes the
well-known rights to freedom of speech and religion, Due Process, and the

18. See William Bradford Reynolds, Another View: Our Magnificent Constitution, 40 VAND. L.
REV. 1343, 1346 (1987) (discussing the framers’ approach to protecting individual liberty).
19. U.S. CONST. art. I (legislative), art. II (executive), and art. III (judicial).
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (interstate and foreign commerce), art. I, § 8, cl. 12–14 (raising
and supporting armies, providing and maintaining a navy, and making rules for land and naval forces,
respectively), art. II, § 2, cl. 1–2 (President is the Commander-in-Chief and has power to make treaties
provided that two-thirds of Senate concurs).
21. U.S. CONST. art. III.
22. See Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 309,
353–54 (1998). The text did contain one provision that is understood to be a personal right. Article III,
Section 2 included the right to a trial by jury. Justice Scalia called this limitation on the judiciary “the
spinal column of American democracy,” as opposed to the “Johnny-come-lately” constitutional rights,
like the right to counsel, which were added to the Constitution through the Bill of Rights. Neder v. United
States, 527 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
23. See Bogus, supra note 22, at 353–54 (explaining that Virginia, the last state to ratify the
Constitution, did not do so until after delegates to the state’s constitutional convention had been assured
that the creation of a bill of rights would follow ratification).
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right to the assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings.24 But the right to
the assistance of counsel in the Bill of Rights applied only to the nascent
federal government, not to the States, and it did not guarantee attorneys for
defendants who could not afford them. The Sixth Amendment simply
allowed defendants to retain and use private counsel in federal criminal
prosecutions.25
The mechanisms to enforce decisions of the Supreme Court in criminal
cases have evolved over the past 200 years, expanding significantly but also
generating countervailing federalism constraints. In the Judiciary Act of
1789,26 Congress created the lower federal courts. Although initially limited
to matters such as suits in admiralty and actions involving citizens of
different states or subjects of foreign nations, the jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts was later expanded to provide a forum for claims arising under
the federal constitution.27 The Judiciary Act also provided that the new
federal courts had the power to issue writs of habeas corpus.28 Following the
Civil War, the Constitution for the first time required the states to provide
Due Process of law and to extend the privileges and immunities of federal
citizenship to all Americans.29 At that time, Congress also extended the writ
of habeas corpus to state cases,30 though the scope of review was initially
understood to be very narrow.31 These developments set the stage for the
Supreme Court and the lower federal courts to review individual state
convictions for federal constitutional error32 either upon direct review of the
24. U.S. CONST. amends. I, V, VI.
25. See John D. King, Beyond “Life and Liberty”: The Evolving Right to Counsel, 48 HARV. C.RC.L. L. REV. 1, 6–8 (2013).
26. Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, ch. 20, §§ 2–3.
27. See generally Wythe Holt, “To Establish Justice”: Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the
Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421.
28. See Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, ch. 20, § 14. Article I of the Constitution provides that
Congress may not suspend the writ of habeas corpus. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment also gave Congress the authority
to pass legislation to enforce those rights through its enforcement clause. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
In 1979, Congress enacted legislation providing a civil cause of action for “the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
30. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 1197 (7th ed. 2015) (calling the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 the “most significant expansion of
the writ”); see also BRIAN R. MEANS, INTRODUCTION TO HABEAS CORPUS: A PRIMER ON COLLATERAL
REVIEW 28 (2015).
31. This initial legislative expansion of the writ for state prisoners could only be used to challenge
the state court’s jurisdiction in the matter and was not an available avenue to challenge other elements of
the prisoner’s detention. MEANS, supra note 30, at 28.
32. The Court formally recognized this power in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 485–87 (1953). In
his concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter noted that, “the prior State determination of a claim under the
United States Constitution cannot foreclose [a federal court’s] consideration of such a claim, else the
State court would have the final say, which the Congress, by the Act of 1867, provided it should not
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conviction in the Supreme Court or in a habeas action initiated in federal
district court.33 With nearly 700 federal court judges currently on the bench,34
these developments allow defendants to seek habeas corpus relief in local
courts that have the time and capacity to hear their cases. Upon a finding of
such a constitutional error, the federal court can—depending on the
procedure used to seek review—reverse a state conviction or order a state
prisoner’s release.35
The enforcement of the right to counsel in Europe reflects the very
different history, purpose, and structure of the Council of Europe and the
Convention. The Council of Europe was created following World War II, as
Europe recovered from atrocities and widespread human rights abuses and
responded to the beginning of the Cold War.36 The Council’s core purposes
are more narrowly defined than those of the United States government or the
European Union.37 From its inception in 1949,38 the Council identified the
protection of rule of law, human rights, and fundamental freedoms as among

have.” Id. at 500 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Even at this point, however, the justices remained anxious
about disrupting the balance between federal and state courts. Justice Frankfurter emphasized that “a
casual, unrestricted opening of the doors of the federal courts to these claims not only would cast an undue
burden upon those courts, but would also disregard our duty to support and not weaken the sturdy
enforcement of their criminal laws by the States.” Id. at 498.
33. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari to review judgments of the
highest state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2012) (reviewing for claim of right, privilege, or immunity under
the Constitution). The district courts have jurisdiction to entertain applications by state prisoners for a
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012).
34. U.S. COURTS, Chronological History of Authorized Judgeships - District Courts, http://www.
uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/authorized-judgeships/chronological-history-authorized-judgeshipsdistrict-courts [https://perma.cc/GZ3R-QMYK] (last visited Oct. 11, 2016) (listing 667 district judges).
35. If a case reaches the Supreme Court on certiorari from the state judgment of conviction, the
Court may hold that the conviction is invalid. But the Supreme Court hears fewer than 100 cases per year,
and accordingly the vast majority of state convictions are challenged in habeas actions in the federal
district court. As a technical matter, a habeas action brought by a state prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
is a civil action challenging the legality of the prisoner’s detention. If the court finds a constitutional
defect in the conviction, the prisoner’s detention is unlawful, and the remedy is to order the state to release
the defendant or retry him within a specified period of time. See generally CHARLES DOYLE, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL33391, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: A BRIEF LEGAL OVERVIEW (2006).
36. A full account of these issues is beyond the scope of this article, but another author has
discussed the ebb and flow of the ECtHR’s authority and legitimacy. See generally Mikael Rask Madsen,
The Challenging Authority of the European Court of Human Rights: From Cold War Legal Diplomacy
to the Brighton Declaration and Backlash, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 141 (2016).
37. The Council of Europe is not a “government” in the conventional sense. It consists of
representatives of the member states and has only the limited function assigned to it by the treaty.
38. The Council of Europe was founded on May 5, 1949, by the Treaty of London (or Statute of
the Council of Europe), which was signed on that day by ten states: Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Statute of the Council
of Europe, May 5, 1949, 87 U.N.T.S. 103, http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/con
ventions/rms/0900001680306052 [https://perma.cc/3S54-YCAK].
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its principle functions.39 Those purposes were implemented by the adoption
in 1950 of the European Convention on Human Rights,40 to which all fortyseven members of the Council are now signatories.41 Human rights are the
exclusive subject of the Convention, which defined the protected rights and
created a court to adjudicate them (but no system of subsidiary human rights
courts). Finally, the Convention provided—without further amplification—
that the Committee of Ministers would supervise the execution of the Court’s
judgments. Although the initial cost of ratifying the Convention was low,
because it did not require member states to submit to the jurisdiction of the
ECtHR or provide for individual petitions, all major states later accepted
these now compulsory features.42
From this rudimentary beginning, the Convention’s enforcement
mechanisms have been developed and strengthened by amendments to the
Convention,43 the development of detailed administrative procedures,44 and
further actions of the ECtHR as well as other organs of the Council of
Europe.45 And in recent years, the European Union has adopted measures
that are based in part on the same principles underlying the ECtHR’s
judgments protecting human rights, including the right to counsel.46
II. ENFORCING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN THE UNITED
STATES
The U.S. constitutional right to counsel, as it is now understood,
subjects the states to federal oversight. Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause,47
39. In the preamble, the signatories reaffirmed “their devotion to the spiritual and moral values
which are the common heritage of their peoples and the true source of individual freedom, political liberty
and the rule of law, principles which form the basis of all genuine democracy.” Id. Article 3 stated that
“[e]very member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law and of the
enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and
collaborate sincerely and effectively in the realisation of the aim . . . .” Id.
40. See supra note 11.
41. A list of the 47 signatories may be found at Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, COUNCIL OF EUROPE TREATY OFFICE, http://conventions.coe.int/
Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=1&DF=14/05/2015&CL=ENG
[https://perma.cc/77GU-G8AM] (last visited Oct. 11, 2016).
42. See Madsen, supra note 36.
43. See infra Part III.B.1.
44. See infra Part III.B.2.
45. See infra Part III.B.3–4.
46. See infra Part III.C. See Directive 2013/48/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 22 October 2013 on the Right of Access to a Lawyer in Criminal Proceedings and in European Arrest
Warrant Proceedings, and on the Right to Have a Third Party Informed upon Deprivation of Liberty and
to Communicate with Third Persons and with Consular Authorities while Deprived of Liberty, 2013 O.J.
(L 294) 1 (EC).
47. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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state convictions are invalid if they do not meet the standards of the federal
Constitution.48 However, as noted, the right to counsel was not a part of the
original design of the U.S. Constitution. The current positive right to the
assistance of government-paid counsel developed as a result of significant
changes to both the text of the Constitution and the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the text.49 In the 1860s, following the U.S. Civil War, the
Constitution was amended to impose new restrictions on states, including the
requirement that they not deprive any person of life or liberty without Due
Process of law.50 A century later, in the 1960s, the Supreme Court read Due
Process to incorporate most of the Bill of Rights—including the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel—against the states.51 In the landmark case of
Gideon v. Wainwright,52 the Court held that a right to state-compensated
counsel was implicit in the general requirement of Due Process.53 Then, for
the first time, the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts54 were faced
with the task of enforcing the Court’s right to counsel precedents in state
proceedings.
In the following section, we describe how the right to counsel has been
interpreted within the constraints of the American political system.
A. Due Process as a Basis for the Right to Counsel
1. The Right to Publicly-Compensated Counsel in a Criminal Case
In Gideon, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment imposes
an affirmative duty on the states to provide publicly-compensated counsel to
indigent defendants in any case where the defendant upon conviction might

48. See infra note 54. State courts are also obliged by the Supremacy Clause to apply federal
constitutional standards. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
49. We draw the discussion in this section, in part, from earlier work on this topic by one of us. See
generally Richard E. Myers II, Adversarial Counsel in an Inquisitorial System, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L. &
COM. REG. 411 (2011).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
51. See generally, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (incorporating the protection
against double jeopardy); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (incorporating the right to a
speedy trial); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (incorporating the protection against selfincrimination).
52. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
53. Id. at 341–44.
54. There are two avenues for federal review of state criminal convictions. A defendant whose
conviction is affirmed by the state court on direct appeal may seek discretionary review by a petition for
certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. If the defendant’s appeal is unsuccessful, he may bring a separate
collateral attack (commonly referred to as habeas proceedings), which is filed in federal district court
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. An adverse decision in the habeas proceeding may be appealed to the U.S. Court
of Appeals, and certiorari may again be sought in the Supreme Court.
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be incarcerated.55 The Court reasoned that “in our adversary system of
criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer,
cannot be assured of a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This
seems to us to be an obvious truth.”56 The Court subsequently ruled that the
right to state-funded counsel is applicable not only at trial, but also at any
critical stage after the commencement of adversarial proceedings.57 It also
held that defendants have the right to the “effective” assistance of counsel.58
Finally, in its famous Miranda59 ruling, the Court held that a defendant
subject to custodial interrogation must be informed that he has a right to
consult counsel and that if he cannot afford counsel one will be provided for
him.60
2. The Test for the Adequacy of Counsel
As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the Sixth Amendment does not
guarantee indigent defendants access to excellent lawyers or an error-free
defense. As long as counsel is sufficiently competent to ensure that the
judicial process was adversarial in nature, the constitutional standard has
been met.61 The Court has also held that representation should not be ruled
ineffective unless “counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning
of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having
produced a just result.”62
In general,63 the Supreme Court has held that ineffectiveness is to be
judged by a two-pronged test.64 First, the attorney’s performance must be
deficient, falling below an objective standard of reasonableness; and second,
55. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345.
56. Id. at 344.
57. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 11 (1970).
58. Id. at 7.
59. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
60. Id. at 467. Note, however, that Miranda’s holding on the right to counsel was grounded on the
Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination rather than the Sixth Amendment right to a fair
trial, because adversarial proceedings had not yet commenced.
61. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984) (“The right to the effective assistance of
counsel is thus the right of the accused to require the prosecution’s case to survive the crucible of
meaningful adversarial testing. When a true adversarial criminal trial has been conducted—even if
defense counsel may have made demonstrable errors—the kind of testing envisioned by the Sixth
Amendment has occurred.”).
62. United States v. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
63. There are a limited number of circumstances where the prejudicial effect required in the second
prong will be presumed—the complete denial of counsel, counsel’s refusal to participate, and perhaps
cases where there is an unwaived conflict of interest that would so substantially interfere with counsel’s
ability to act as an advocate that he would be deemed not to have participated. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE
ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.7 (5th ed. 2009).
64. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
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counsel’s failure must have prejudiced the defendant.65 To demonstrate
prejudice, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that the outcome
of the case might have been different absent the deficient performance. In
applying this test, defense counsel must be given wide latitude to represent
the defendant, and judicial scrutiny must be “highly deferential.”66
The combined effect of these rulings is that a defense attorney who
barely passes the minimal threshold of competence meets the Sixth
Amendment standard, as long as the attorney was allowed to contest the
prosecution’s case and in fact did so. Although federal courts found
violations of the right to counsel in a limited number of instances where a
defendant was systematically deprived of defense counsel,67 for the most part
the courts have found ineffectiveness only when the actions of counsel were
so deficient as to reduce the trial to a “mockery of justice.”68
3. The Reality of the Right to Counsel
Many indigent defendants in the United States are represented by
attorneys who are demonstrably ineffective, and insufficient funding is
directly related to inadequacy of representation.69 Because public defense
systems in most states are chronically underfunded,70 defenders must
represent their clients with only a fraction of the time and resources required
to do their job well.71 As the Right to Counsel Committee stated:
Frequently, public defenders are asked to represent far too many clients.
Sometimes the defenders have well over 100 clients at a time, with many
clients charged with serious offenses, and their cases moving quickly
through the court system. As a consequence, defense lawyers are
constantly forced to violate their oaths as attorneys because their caseloads

65. Id.
66. Id. at 689. The Court declined to establish specific requirements that counsel must meet, stating:
No particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take account of the
variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding
how best to represent a criminal defendant. Any such set of rules would interfere with the
constitutionally protected independence of counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must
have in making tactical decisions.
Id. at 688–89.
67. See RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 169 (2d ed. 2005).
68. Id.
69. See NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT
OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL (2009) [hereinafter RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMMITTEE].
70. To illustrate, consider the funding scheme in Louisiana, where close to 70% of the budget for
public defenders comes from minor court fees of $45 each, creating a system that inevitably prohibits
defenders from spending sufficient time with their clients. Dylan Walsh, On the Defensive, THE
ATLANTIC (June 2, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/on-the-defensive/485
165/ [https://perma.cc/TJ4D-QN7D].
71. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but
for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1844–49 (1994).
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make it impossible for them to practice law as they are required to do
according to the profession’s rules. They cannot interview their clients
properly, effectively seek their pretrial release, file appropriate motions,
conduct necessary fact investigations, negotiate responsibly with the
prosecutor, adequately prepare for hearings, and perform countless other
tasks that normally would be undertaken by a lawyer with sufficient time
and resources.72

Critics have called the current state of indigent defense a tragedy73 and
a “national disgrace.”74 The system, they argue, is one-sided, and it
substitutes expediency for accuracy, and economy for justice.
B. Barriers to Enforcement
Constitutional rights should be enforced without regard to the public
appetite for such enforcement, but there are structural, constitutional, and
political reasons why the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have
not taken more steps to enforce the constitutional guarantee of access to
effective counsel.
1. The Limitations Imposed by Federalism
The federal courts do not have a general supervisory power over state
courts in the United States, and federalism limits the federal courts’ role in
constitutional enforcement. Although the Supreme Court has binding
authority over state courts on constitutional questions, each of the fifty states
is a separate sovereign in the U.S. structure. National power exists only to
the extent that the states have delegated such power to the national
government under a constitutional provision.75 Federalism concerns have led
the federal courts to construe narrowly both the right to counsel and the scope
of federal judicial review. The limitations on federal judicial review have

72. See RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMMITTEE, supra note 69, at 7.
73. See, e.g., Lawrence C. Marshall, Gideon’s Paradox, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 968 (2004)
(stating “grossly incompetent lawyers whom none of us would trust with traffic offenses are being
entrusted with the lives and liberty of indigent defendants”); Anthony C. Thompson, The Promise of
Gideon: Providing High-Quality Public Defense in America, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 713, 713 (2013)
(calling indigent defense “the proverbial neglected child in the justice system”);. see generally, e.g., Mary
Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, a National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS
L.J. 1031 (2006) (describing multiple instances in which innocent defendants languished in jail without
the ability to even contact a public defender).
74. Deborah L. Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 869, 894
(2009); see also Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the
Constitutional Right of Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 625 (1986).
75. The emphasis Supreme Court justices place on the concept of delegated powers varies. Strict
constructionists treat it as a significant limitation, while others have been more willing to expand the
Court’s power to enforce a flexible, “living constitution.” See generally, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, The
Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976).
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affected both individual relief—particularly habeas corpus for state
prisoners—as well as more sweeping remedies.
Although the scope of review available in habeas corpus actions
expanded in the 1960s, beginning in the 1970s federalism concerns led the
courts and Congress to retrench and severely limit judicial review of state
convictions. In a series of 1960s decisions, the Supreme Court allowed state
prisoners to challenge the constitutionality of their detention.76 This seemed
to lay the groundwork for a requirement that the states provide fully effective
counsel.77 But within a decade the Supreme Court cut back on the scope of
post-conviction judicial review in response to countervailing federalism
concerns,78 and in the 1990s Congress further restricted habeas relief.79
Similarly, the principles of federalism pose a substantial barrier to
federal courts ordering any state to engage in deep structural reform.
Requiring a more fully-realized right to counsel would force state
legislatures to engage in massive spending. As the bipartisan National Right
to Counsel Committee notes: “Taken together, the Court’s historic rulings,
based upon the federal Constitution’s Sixth Amendment counsel provision,
are a significant, high-cost, unfunded mandate imposed upon state and/or
local governments.”80 State budget crises across the nation81 make it
particularly unpopular for courts to order the level of spending that the
commitment requires.82
76. See generally, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
77. Indeed, habeas review of state court criminal proceedings reached its “high water mark” in the
1960s under Chief Justice Earl Warren. See MEANS, supra note 30, at 34. For example, in Townsend v.
Sain, the Court held that the federal courts could not only review the findings of law made by state courts,
but they could also review findings of fact and order evidentiary hearings to uncover underlying facts.
372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963).
78. See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993) (establishing a more stringent
standard of reviewing constitutional violations for a “substantial and injurious effect” on the verdict as
opposed to a harmless error standard); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976) (“[W]here the State has
provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does
not require that a state prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence
obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.”); see generally MEANS,
supra note 30, at 37.
79. See MEANS, supra note 30, at 40 (discussing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996, which Congress passed following the bombing of an Oklahoma City federal building amid
concerns that federal habeas petitions hindered a swift response to such crimes); see generally FALLON,
supra note 30, at 1198.
80. RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMMITTEE, supra note 69, at 29–30.
81. Tracy Gordon, State and Local Finance: Where We’re Going, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
(Jan. 31, 2011) (“U.S. state governments are facing budgetary shortfalls that threaten important public
services and state employee pensions. From New York to Texas to California, states across the country
must deal with revenue and spending imbalances, forcing governments to make hard choices on how to
meet basic needs.”).
82. In fact, in the budget passed by the Louisiana state legislature for 2017, the funding for public
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2. The Case or Controversy Limitation
Article III of the U.S. Constitution authorizes the federal courts to hear
cases related to specific “cases” or “controversies.”83 As a result, remedies
for violations of the right to counsel are administered by the courts on an ad
hoc basis. Remedies usually take the form of conviction reversals or habeas
relief, both of which apply only to the defendant in the case at bar. Even if a
court recognizes that the violation of an individual defendant’s right to
counsel is part of a systemic problem, it will not ordinarily order a remedy
beyond the reversal of that defendant’s conviction.
What would it take to overcome the case or controversy limitation? It
depends on whom you ask. Some scholars suggest that the federal courts
would actually be exceeding their power to order relief unless they could
establish that an actual violation occurred.84 Other commentators believe that
the federal courts have artificially limited class-action access to injunctive
relief through abstention doctrines.85
Could a defendant prosecuted in state court persuade a federal court to
issue an order enforcing the right to effective counsel for himself and all
other similarly situated defendants if he could demonstrate that the state
public defenders are so overworked that they cannot properly investigate and
try cases, and that the lack of funding for experts and investigators
necessitates triage among defendants? As the law now stands, such an order
seems unlikely. The federal courts have been reluctant to enforce the right to
counsel through injunctive relief. Instead, the courts have refused to hear
such cases, invoking so-called Younger abstention to avoid the issue.86 In
Younger v. Harris,87 the Supreme Court held that the lower federal courts
should avoid hearing cases that unduly interfere with the legitimate activities
of state courts. In cases involving access to counsel, the Younger doctrine
usually means that the federal courts will not interfere until an individual

defenders was cut by 62%. See Walsh, supra note 70.
83. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
84. See, e.g., Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 427, 453–55 (2009) (noting the “proposition that plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief
in federal court must assert an ongoing violation or one that is likely to occur again in the future.” (citing
Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 96 (1983))).
85. See, e.g., Eve Brensike Primus, Litigation Strategies for Dealing with the Indigent Defense
Crisis, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y 4–5 (Sept. 2010).
86. See generally Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673 (11th Cir. 1992). The case that suggested the
most promise for a federal 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) lawsuit was Luckey v. Harris, where the court
recognized that prospective relief in a civil suit required a different standard than an ineffective assistance
claim under Strickland and Cronic, but ultimately dismissed the case on abstention grounds. 860 F.2d
1012 (11th Cir. 1988).
87. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44–45 (1971).
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defendant has exhausted all possible remedies under state law.88 As a result,
structural reform litigation challenging the adequacy of indigent defense
systems has seen little success in federal courts,89 although there have been
changes in several states attributed to settlements or consent decrees.90
3. The Limitations of Institutional Reform Litigation
Structural reform litigation also generates concerns about the
institutional capacity of the federal courts and the related question of whether
such judicial reforms can be effective. These concerns are heightened when
state institutions are involved. Criminal justice reform also raises special
concerns about public safety.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown v. Plata91 provides a vivid
example of the interaction of these concerns. The decision in Brown to
require California to dramatically reduce its prison population deeply
divided the Court. Critics questioned the legitimacy of the Court’s action,92
and it remains uncertain how effective the Court’s ruling has been. A
majority of the Court accepted the lower court’s finding that California’s
grossly overloaded prison medical system was causing needless fatalities
among inmates and was “broken beyond repair.”93 Accordingly, the majority
upheld the lower court’s order requiring California to reduce its prison
population to 137.5% of design capacity within two years.94 The ruling
prompted two passionate dissents. Justice Scalia characterized the order as
“the most radical injunction issued by a court in our Nation’s history: an
88. See Primus, supra note 85, at 4–5 (“Federal courts have relied on abstention doctrine to refuse
to hear federal civil rights cases that allege systemic right-to-counsel violations.”).
89. See Drinan, supra note 84, at 468.
90. See id. at 443–62 (describing more successful “second generation” indigent defense litigation);
Carol S. Steiker, Gideon at Fifty: A Problem of Political Will, 122 YALE L.J. 2694, 2701–04 (2013)
(discussing litigation in Florida, Virginia, Massachusetts, Georgia, Washington, Pennsylvania and
Connecticut) (“[T]he wide differences among jurisdictions along many dimensions—including the nature
and extent of their indigent defense problems, their local politics, the insulation of their courts from
political pressures, and the availability of potential allies—mean that there can be no one model for
successful structural litigation. But the experience of the varied jurisdictions that have achieved some
substantial steps forward in this way suggests that structural litigation has potential . . . to generate the
political will to promote indigent defense reform.”); Anthony C. Thompson, The Promise of Gideon:
Providing High-Quality Public Defense in America, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 713, 741 (2013) (discussing
generally successful litigation in Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York,
and Washington, but noting the cases take years to complete and longer to implement any remedies).
91. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 493 (2011).
92. See, e.g., Hans Bader, Supreme Court Upholds Radical Court Ruling Releasing Thousands of
California Prisoners, WASH. EXAMINER (May 23, 2011), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/
supreme-court-upholds-radical-court-ruling-releasing-thousands-of-california-prisoners/article/145491
[https://perma.cc/8JXY-QSJ2].
93. Brown, 563 U.S. at 507.
94. Id. at 541.
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order requiring California to release the staggering number of 46,000
convicted criminals,” and stated that “the institutional reform the District
Court has undertaken . . . ignores bedrock limitations on the power of Article
III judges, and takes federal courts wildly beyond their institutional
capacity.”95 Justice Alito emphasized that “[t]he Constitution does not give
federal judges the authority to run state penal systems. Decisions regarding
state prisons have profound public safety and financial implications, and the
States are generally free to make these decisions as they choose.”96
Moreover, five years after the decision, it is unclear whether the Court’s
mandate has been effective. Although there was an initial reduction in
overcrowding when state prisoners were moved to local jails—which may
themselves have become overcrowded—progress stalled, and the state
sought multiple extensions that some considered nothing more than a delay
tactic.97
Similar questions have been raised about other forms of institutional
reform litigation, such as public school desegregation, another area in which
the federal judiciary imposed unfunded mandates on states. The Supreme
Court ordered the desegregation of public schools in Brown v. Board of
Education,98 one of the most-heralded decisions in its history. But the
decision had little immediate impact, particularly in the Jim Crow South,
until Congress passed the Civil Rights Act in 1964.99 A wave of lawsuits
designed to desegregate southern public schools followed. Even with
congressional action, long-lasting change has been elusive.100 In the 1960s
and 1970s, factors like racially segregated neighborhoods and “white flight”
made desegregation difficult to enforce.101 Now, even districts that had once
been relatively integrated are seeing racial disparities in schools rise.102
95. Id. at 550 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 565 (Alito, J., dissenting).
97. See Lawrence K. Karlton, Prison Litigation and District Court’s Effect on the Electoral
Process, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 377, 383 (2015) (noting that the court denied California’s request for
adjustments of the prisoner population reduction target in 2012 and 2013, and later granted a two-year
extension on the condition that the state bring no more appeals).
98. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
99. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1022 (2004); see generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW
HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008) (concluding that in the absence of
action by Congress and the executive branch, U.S. courts were unsuccessful in desegregating schools,
and more generally that courts have very limited means to bring about social change).
100. See Cowan v. Bolivar Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 2:65-CV-31-DMB, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
63480, at *157 (N.D. Miss. May 13, 2016) (requiring a school district that had avoided integration in the
fifty years since Brown v. Board to consolidate its schools to remedy the unconstitutional segregation of
its students).
101. Sabel & Simon, supra note 99, at 1023.
102. See generally Sean F. Reardon & John T. Yun, Integrating Neighborhoods, Segregating
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Despite the promise of Brown, “[s]ince the late 1970s, a sense of fatigue and
futility has hung over large-scale desegregation efforts.”103
4. The Interaction of Legal and Political Barriers
The underlying problem in enforcing a robust right to state-funded
counsel is political: criminal defendants are a constituency without a
champion. Barry Scheck explains the problem:
[I]ndigent defense remains the neglected stepchild of the criminal justice
system. It lacks a natural base, a core constituency with legislative
influence—poor people charged with crimes, often disenfranchised by
criminal convictions, and disproportionately from racial minorities, have
limited political power in the first place. And there is a vicious cycle at
work as well—the worse the representation of institutional defenders and
court-appointed counsel, the less the community wants to rally for a larger
defender budget or higher counsel fees.104

Thus the problem is one of political will, especially in a time of
competing claims for limited government resources.105 Lawyers are
expensive, and the level of defense funding required to meet the demands of
the most outspoken critics would be massive.
The Supreme Court’s decisions can be seen as a response to this
political reality. As Darryl Brown put it, “Strickland represents the
[Supreme] Court’s acquiescence to a widespread legislative judgment
against the institutionalization of zealous defense counsel.”106 Moreover,
since the problems in right to counsel cases arise principally in state—not
federal—prosecutions, the federal courts are limited by principles of
federalism. Congress may have the constitutional authority to pass a national
right to counsel law,107 but it has not done so.
III. ENFORCING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN EUROPE
The right to counsel developed very differently in Europe than in the
United States. In the United States, the right to state-compensated counsel
Schools: The Retreat from School Desegregation in the South 1990–2000, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1563 (2003).
103. Sabel & Simon, supra note 99, at 1023.
104. Barry Scheck, Four Reforms for the Twenty-First Century, 96 JUDICATURE 323, 324 (May–
June 2013) (footnotes omitted).
105. Carol Steiker states the problem this way: “With clamoring demand for dwindling public funds
for schools, hospitals, roads and bridges, public transportation, firefighters, and police officers, it is not
surprising that more money for lawyers representing alleged criminals is not high on anyone’s list.
Generating the will to provide these crucial resources is an enormous challenge.” Steiker, supra note 90,
at 2700.
106. Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal
Adjudication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1604 (2005).
107. See Cara H. Drinan, The National Right to Counsel: A Congressional Solution to the Nation’s
Indigent Defense Crisis, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 487, 489 (2010).
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was extended to state prosecutions long after adoption of the U.S.
Constitution, and it has since been severely limited by the judiciary’s
inability (or unwillingness) to impose systemic reforms on the states. Despite
formal recognition of the right, resource constraints have crippled the
representation of indigent defendants in state prosecutions, and the courts
repeatedly face serious questions about the sufficiency of that representation,
its limitations, and its requirements. As a practical matter, the right to counsel
has been a hollow promise: most indigent defendants do not receive truly
effective representation. On the other hand, an independent European right
to counsel was created only sixty-five years ago by a treaty that explicitly
guaranteed state-funded counsel, and this understanding of the right was
ratified by each of the Council of Europe’s member states. Although initially
there were few methods to enforce the judgments of the ECtHR, multiple
enforcement mechanisms have been developed over the last few decades.
Both the Court itself and the Committee of Ministers (“CoM”), the Council
of Europe’s decision-making body,108 have expanded their repertoire of
enforcement mechanisms, which now make up the modern Strasbourg
supervisory system. The Court’s judgments now include not only specific
remedies for individual claimants, but also general remedies mandating
systemic change.109 Further, the CoM now asserts the authority to instruct
member states to develop general, forward-looking remedies for violations
of rights, assuring that systemic problems are addressed.110 The CoM can
make recommendations as to how states should safeguard rights, particularly
when a single member state is repeatedly the source of cases before the
Court. Other Council of Europe organs, including the Parliamentary
Assembly and the Commissioner for Human Rights, can also exert pressure
on noncompliant states.111 In addition to the Council of Europe, the European
Union—an independent body with overlapping membership—has created
further pressure for states to recognize the right to counsel with a directive
instructing its member states to provide suspects with access to an
attorney.112
Although these changes in the Strasbourg supervisory system (and the
EU directives) lay the groundwork for more robust implementation of the
right to counsel in Europe than in the United States, the responses of member
states to the Court’s judgment in Salduz have been uneven. This may be due
108. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note
11, at art. 46, ¶¶ 1–2.
109. See infra Part III.B.3.
110. See infra Part III.B.2.
111. See infra Part III.B.4.
112. See generally supra note 46.
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to the lack of consequences with any real bite for member states that refuse
to comply with the ECtHR’s judgments. Moreover, the determination that
counsel must be provided in the pretrial phase does not pose the most
difficult task for courts. The Strasbourg system has not yet faced the even
more difficult task of determining whether counsel, if provided, is adequate.
A. The Convention’s Original Enforcement Mechanism
The initial Convention provided only a skeletal framework for the
enforcement of the ECtHR’s judgments. Article 46 committed all
contracting states to “abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to
which they are parties,” and stated that the final judgment of the ECtHR
“shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise
its execution.”113 The CoM is made up of the foreign ministers of all member
states (or their permanent representatives). In practice, the foreign ministers
quickly delegated this supervisory authority. In May 1951 the Committee
invited each state to appoint a permanent representative who would reside in
Strasbourg, and in 1952 the Committee decided that each minister could
appoint a deputy with the same decision-making powers as the minister. The
deputy usually serves as a state’s permanent representative.114
Prior to 1998, the CoM had only four methods of enforcement at its
disposal if a member state appeared unwilling or unable to comply with a
ECtHR judgment: applying diplomatic pressure, issuing “interim
resolutions” encouraging states to comply, publishing press releases
highlighting compliance issues, and expelling the offending member state
from the Council of Europe.115 The first three methods were not always
effective in ensuring compliance, and the last was so extreme that it has only
been used once, and then in response to a military takeover, not an ECtHR
compliance issue.116
B. The Convention’s Current Enforcement Regime
The original bare-bones provisions of the Convention have been
supplemented by amendments to the Convention, a variety of new

113. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 11, at
art. 46, ¶¶ 1–2.
114. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, About the Committee of Ministers (2016),
http://www.coe.int/t/cm/aboutCM_en.asp [https://perma.cc/7MS7-UFBK] (last visited Oct. 11, 2016).
115. Déborah Forst, The Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, Limits
and Ways Ahead, 7 VIENNA J. ON INT’L CONST. L. 1, 3, 14–15 (2013).
116. Greece was on the verge of being expelled from the Council in 1967, after a military junta took
control of the government. But at the last minute, the junta itself withdrew Greece from the Council. See
B. VIVEKANANDAN, INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATS 123 (1997).
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administrative measures (“working methods”), new judicial processes, and
actions by other organs of the Council.
1. Amendments to the Convention
Amendments to the Convention made the Court’s jurisdiction
mandatory and gave the CoM additional enforcement options. Protocol 11,117
which entered into force in 1998, allowed individuals to apply directly to the
Court when they believed their rights had been violated by member states
and made acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction mandatory for all member
states.118 Protocol 14, which entered into force in 2010,119 made two changes
in Article 46. First, if the CoM determines that uncertainty regarding the
meaning of a judgment is hindering its enforcement, it can seek an
interpretation of the ruling from the ECtHR.120 This change is intended to
resolve deadlocks when the Court’s jurisprudence is unclear.121 Second, in a
case in which the CoM believes a state is refusing to abide by a judgment to
which it is a party, the CoM can refer to the Court the question whether the
state has failed to fulfill its obligation.122 This provision is intended to be
applied in exceptional circumstances when the respondent state and the CoM
have failed to reach agreement on adequate measures, or the respondent state
117. Protocols to the Convention are similar in some respects to amendments to the U.S. Constitution
in that they may revise, supplement, or redefine sections of the original document’s text. Just as
amendments must be ratified by states, the protocols are similarly ratified as separate treaties by member
states. See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THE ECHR IN 50 QUESTIONS 3 (2014),
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/50Questions_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5KN-5L7U]. Protocol 11
has been signed and ratified by all forty-seven member states. See Chart of Signatures and Ratifications
of Treaty 155 – Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2016), http://www.coe.int/en/web/
conventions/search-on-treaties/-/conventions/treaty/155/signatures?p_auth=9vH3s4r1
[https://perma.cc/V9T9-7WKJ] (last visited Oct. 11, 2016).
118. See generally Ed Bates, The UK and Strasbourg: A Strained Relationship—The Long View, 12
UNIV. OF LEISCESTER SCH. OF LAW. No. 15-05 (2015) (describing the opposition to this change in the
United Kingdom).
119. All forty-seven member states have signed and ratified this protocol. See Chart of Signatures
and Ratifications of Treaty 194 – Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2016), http://www.coe.int/
en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/194/signatures?p_auth=NKH3Mvl2
[https://perma.cc/24J2-9JQ8] (last visited Oct. 11, 2016).
120. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 11, at
art. 46, ¶ 3.
121. Forst, supra note 115, at 15.
122. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 11, at
art. 46, ¶ 4. Referral to the Court under art. 46, ¶ 4, by itself, has no consequences other than a possible
finding of the Court that the State has failed to comply, under art. 46, ¶ 5. The case is then referred back
to the Committee of Ministers “for consideration of the measures to be taken.” The Convention does not
indicate what those measures might be. That is where the administrative procedures, discussed in Part
III.B.2, come into play.
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is unable (or unwilling) to take the necessary measures. It therefore fills a
gap between what one author has called “the soft (interim resolutions) and
nuclear (expulsion from the Council of Europe) means at the disposal of the
Committee of Ministers.”123 The changes were intended to have a deterrent
effect on the states and to increase the legitimacy at the national level of
necessary but unpopular measures, such as budgetary allocations.124 Actions
by the CoM could give national lawmakers an incentive to adequately fund
counsel for indigent defendants, even in the absence of strong public support
for such a program.
2. Administrative Procedures
Many administrative measures have been implemented to streamline
the Court’s processes and to provide greater oversight of states’ execution of
judgments. The CoM holds four Human Rights meetings a year, and day-today supervision is in the hands of the Deputies, who meet weekly, and
receive assistance from the CoM Secretariat.
In 2010, the Deputies instructed the Secretariat to prepare detailed plans
for a twin-track approach to continuous supervision.125 Under the new
system, all cases are considered under the standard procedure, unless specific
factors warrant the enhanced procedure.126 Factors calling for the enhanced
procedure include judgments requiring urgent individual measures, “pilot
judgments,”127 and “judgments raising structural and/or complex problems
as identified by the Court or by the Committee of Ministers.”128
When the ECtHR has found a violation by a member state, that state is
required to go through a supervised process to prevent similar violations in
the future. In cases falling under the “standard” procedures, member states
that are found to be in violation of the Convention are expected to present an
“action plan” or a series of action plans.129 Action plans detail the steps the
state intends to take to implement a judgment by individual measures
123. Forst, supra note 115, at 16.
124. Id.
125. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, DEPARTMENT FOR THE EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, SUPERVISION OF THE EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS AND DECISIONS OF THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERLAKEN ACTION PLAN—
MODALITIES FOR A TWIN-TRACK SUPERVISION SYSTEM, Doc. No. CM/Inf/DH (2010) 37, at 2 (Sept. 6,
2010), https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0
9000016804a327f [hereinafter SUPERVISION OF EXECUTION].
126. Id. For data on the classification of the cases under the supervision of the CoM in 2015, see
EUR. COMM. OF MINISTERS, 9TH ANNUAL REPORT:SUPERVISION OF THE EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS AND
DECISIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 58–61 (2015).
127. See infra Part III.B.3(a).
128. SUPERVISION OF EXECUTION, supra note 125.
129. Id. at 3.
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affecting the case at bar and more general measures, no later than six months
after a judgment becomes final.130 The Secretariat reviews and assesses all
proposed action plans.131 Member states then produce an “action report”
when they believe all necessary measures have been taken.132 If the state and
the Secretariat agree that the measures adopted or implemented are
satisfactory, then the Secretariat will propose that the Committee adopt a
final resolution closing the case at the next Human Rights meeting of the
CoM.133
For cases falling under the “enhanced” procedures, the Secretariat
assumes a “more intensive and proactive” role.134 It may assist in the
preparation or implementation of action plans, provide expertise, and
develop bilateral or multilateral cooperation programs to address complex
and substantive issues.135 A standard timetable is provided, and the new
procedures also deal with the failure of a state to present an action plan or
report, and for the resolution of disagreements between the member state and
the Secretariat.136
Thus, while U.S. courts will generally take no action beyond reversing
an individual conviction, in Europe, the CoM and the other agencies of the
Council of Europe have asserted the authority to announce that systemic
changes are required, to monitor progress, and to reward compliance. When
necessary, they can also become closely involved in developing solutions
and ensuring that rights are respected.
3. Judicial Enforcement
Although the ECtHR initially had a “modest conception of its remedial
powers,” in recent years the Court has expanded its orders to include not only
specific remedies for the individual claimant, but also more general remedies
to prevent future violations.137 To prevent similar violations in the future,
states may be required to repeal or revise offending legislation, modify
jurisprudence, or enact “practical measures” such as the building of new
prisons, the appointment of more judges, or the modifications of budgetary

130. SUPERVISION OF EXECUTION, supra note 125.
131. Id. at 3–4.
132. Id. at 4.
133. SUPERVISION OF EXECUTION, supra note 125.
134. Id. at 5.
135. SUPERVISION OF EXECUTION, supra note 125.
136. Id. at 6–7.
137. Laurence R. Helfer, Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: Embeddedness as a
Deep Structural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 125, 146–47
(2008); see also Forst, supra note 115, at 3–10.
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arrangements.138 Surveying thirty-one decisions involving sixteen nations
between 2013 and 2014, the Open Society Justice Initiative found twentyseven ECtHR-ordered “general measures.”139 These included ordering states
to reform their system of judicial discipline, implement reforms in legislation
and administrative practices, set specific time limits, and introduce, as soon
as possible, a specific and clearly regulated compensatory remedy. Five
decisions were pilot judgments and four directed the CoM to take further
action.140 The ECtHR’s most significant procedural development is the pilot
judgment system.
a. Pilot Judgments
In response to a growing number of repetitive cases from the same
member states, which contributed to backlogs and delays, the Court
introduced the system of pilot judgments.141 This system has been
incorporated in the Court’s rules, but not into the Convention. Under the pilot
judgment procedure, the Court identifies the cause of systemic violations
giving rise to many similar cases in a given state. The Court then suspends
examination of the repetitive judgments while supervising general measures
intended to correct the deficiency giving rise to the cases. The pilot case is
subject to the aforementioned enhanced procedures, and respondent states
remain responsible for identifying measures to implement the judgment.
This procedure has been used with some success in a few cases and variants
have also been employed in a larger number of cases.142 The new procedure
has been described as an “important weapon” and a “shift away from the
individualized-justice notion” that puts the Court in a “potentially more
dynamic, ‘constitutional’ role.”143 But the pilot judgment procedure has also
been criticized as exceeding the authority conferred by the Convention and
interfering with the latitude states should have to implement the Court’s
judgments.144 Although there is no system of sanctions for non138. Forst, supra note 115, at 9–10.
139. OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, RECENT REMEDIES DECISIONS FROM THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (June 2015), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/casedigests-echr-remedies-2013-2014-20150708.pdf [https://perma.cc/U25C-MUXM].
140. Id.
141. See ED BATES, THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM
ITS INCEPTION TO THE CREATION OF A PERMANENT COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 490–91 (2010)
(describing the pilot system); Forst, supra note 115, at 19. The seminal case was Broniowski v. Poland,
2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 3.
142. BATES, supra note 141, at 491.
143. Id.
144. Forst, supra note 115, at 20 (citing PHILIP LEACH ET AL., RESPONDING TO SYSTEMATIC HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF ‘PILOT JUDGMENTS’ OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THEIR IMPACT AT NATIONAL LEVEL 29 (2010)); Markus Fyrnys, Expanding Competences
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implementation of pilot judgments, the Court retains the authority to
unfreeze all of the similar cases if no satisfactory solution is adopted.145
b. Other Judicial Techniques
In a number of cases the Court has shown an increasing willingness to
use its judgments to condemn a state when a new violation results from the
state’s failure to implement a previous judgment of the Court and to call on
national courts to implement its jurisprudence. Thus in Greens and M.T. v.
U.K.146 the Court expressly stated that the new violation originated in the
failure of the UK to execute an earlier judgment in Hirst v. U.K. (No. 2).147
Decisions of this nature contrast with the Court’s earlier statements that it
would not control in a second judgment how a state had implemented an
earlier judgment.148 The Court has also pointed out that domestic courts are
obligated to give effect to Convention standards as interpreted by the Court
itself.149
4. Actions by Other Institutions of the Council of Europe
Both the Parliamentary Assembly and the Commissioner for Human
Rights have also undertaken activities intended to help implement the
Court’s judgments. “Since 2000, the Parliamentary Assembly has engaged
in a monitoring procedure for the execution of judgments,” with the idea that
delegations to the Parliamentary Assembly should put pressure on national
powers to execute the Court’s judgments.150 The Parliamentary Assembly’s
Commission for Legal Affairs and Human Rights produces reports, and it
drafts both resolutions for the Assembly and questions for the CoM. The
Commissioner for Human Rights also participates in these activities.
Additionally, under Protocol 14 the Commissioner can intervene in cases
before the CoM as a third party, and he has done so.151
5. Pushback: Challenges to the ECtHR’s Legitimacy
The changes in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence and procedures have been
controversial. In the Brighton Declaration in 2012, all member states called

by the Judicial Lawmaking: The Pilot-Judgment Procedure of the European Court of Human Rights, 12
GERMAN L.J. 1231, 1249 (2011).
145. Forst, supra note 115, at 21.
146. Greens and M.T. v. U.K., 2010-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 57.
147. Hirst v. U.K. (No. 2), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 187.
148. See Mehemi v. France (No. 2), 2003-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 311.
149. See Forst, supra note 115, at 22.
150. Id. at 23.
151. See id. at 24.
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for significant reforms,152 and scholars have raised a variety of concerns
about the Court. Although a full description of the criticism of the ECtHR is
beyond the scope of this article, we note briefly some key points. First, some
critics suggest that the Court has given insufficient weight to state
sovereignty.153 Second, they say the Court is not sufficiently attuned to the
intricacies of the various national systems and issues orders that are both illsuited to those systems and beyond the Court’s power.154 Third, they say the
Court lacks the institutional capacity to manage its own caseload.155 Finally,
some critics question the competency of the Court’s judges.156
C. The European Union Directive
As the Council of Europe has enhanced its enforcement mechanisms
and expanded its role in protecting defendants’ rights, the European Union
has independently pursued some of the same goals, providing a strong
additional incentive for states to guarantee a right to counsel for defendants.
In an effort to buttress the legitimacy of the European Arrest Warrant, which
provides for the arrest and transfer of suspects throughout the European
Union, the EU has endeavored to standardize the pre-trial rights afforded to
suspects across the Continent. In 2009, it issued a resolution laying out a
Roadmap with the purpose of “strengthen[ing] the rights of suspected or
accused persons in criminal proceedings.”157 The Roadmap announced
several unifying procedural measures and provided that nations would have
152. See Madsen, supra note 36, at 144.
153. Madsen, supra note 36, at 144 (“With the Court increasingly overburdened and backlogged—
yet still progressively expanding the scope of the Convention—a number of member states launched, for
the first time since the Court’s creation in 1959, a systematic critique of both the Court’s power over
national law and politics and the quality of the Court’s judges and their judgments.”); see also JONAS
CHRISTOFFERSON & MIKAEL R. MADSEN, Postscript: Understanding the Past, Present and Future of the
European Court of Human Rights, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS BETWEEN LAW AND
POLITICS 230, 239 (2013); COUNCIL OF EUROPE, BRIGHTON DECLARATION (Apr. 20, 2012). See
particularly Part B, Interaction Between the Court and National Authorities, calling for increased attention
to the margin of appreciation and the subsidiarity of the Convention system to national courts; Part D,
Processing of Applications, noting the backlog of the Court; and Part E, Judges and Jurisprudence of the
Court (“The authority and credibility of the Court depend in large part on the quality of its judges and the
judgments they deliver.”).
154. See, e.g., Madsen, supra note 36, at 165 (“The response from French judges was that the ECtHR
simply failed to grasp the complexity of French justice in the Court’s pursuit of a superficial and formalist
attempt to set uniform European standards.”).
155. See id. at 172–73.
156. Madsen, supra note 36, at 169 (“[T]he 2012 Brighton Summit further underscored that the
power of the ECtHR was no longer beyond political debate . . . [I]t openly raised the political question of
the future role of the Court with a series of negative comments on the quality of the judges and their
judgments.”) (citing Brighton Declaration, ¶¶ 23 and 25c (Apr. 20, 2012)).
157. Council Resolution 295/01 of Nov. 30, 2009, on a Roadmap for Strengthening Procedural
Rights of Suspected or Accused Persons in Criminal Proceedings, 2009 O.J. (C 295) 1.

BEALE MYERS - FOR PUBLICATION (DO NOT DELETE)

26

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

11/16/2016 10:33 PM

[Vol 27:1

three years to comply with any attendant directives. Thus far, three directives
have been issued relating to interpretation and translation (2010),158 the right
to information in criminal proceedings (2012),159 and the right of access to a
lawyer (2013).160 The 2013 directive mandates that suspects have access to
a lawyer, including during police questioning, and that the lawyer be able “to
be present and participate effectively” during questioning.161
Although the Roadmap directives were issued independently of the
Convention and the ECtHR,162 they place additional pressure to comply with
the Convention’s pre-trial counsel requirement on countries that are
members of both the Council of Europe and the European Union. There is
evidence that this pressure has already had an impact in countries that were
reluctant to act on the basis of Salduz alone. In France, the reforms that
followed Salduz allowed attorneys to be present at questioning, but not to
speak or to examine the most important documents relating to suspects’
arrests.163 Despite French attorneys’ protests that these restrictions were
inconsistent with Salduz, French courts approved the reforms several times.
But after the EU issued its 2013 directive on the right to information in a
criminal proceeding, the attorneys revived their protests, arguing that Article
7 of the directive established their right to access a suspect’s entire file. As a
result, France’s implementing law, which was eventually passed in 2014,
“was under the microscope before it was even promulgated.”164 And while
the implementing law did not go as far in opening up suspects’ files as many
in France desired, the law did slightly expand the information that must be
made available to attorneys.165

158. Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on
the Right to Interpretation and Translation in Criminal Proceedings, 2010 O.J. (L 280) 1.
159. Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the
Right to Information in Criminal Proceedings, 2012 O.J. (L 142) 1.
160. Directive 2013/48/EU, supra note 46.
161. Directive 2013/48/EU, supra note 46, at art. 3, ¶¶ 1–3.
162. Although the EU and the ECtHR are independent bodies, the directive does refer, explicitly and
approvingly, to the ECtHR’s work on pre-trial rights, stating that it is “building upon Articles 3, 5, 6 and
8” of the Convention and that the ECtHR’s case-law “sets standards on the right of access to a lawyer.”
Directive 2013/48/EU, supra note 46, at ¶ 12.
163. Jessica Finelle & Alex Tinsley, Access to the Criminal Case File: French Example Shows
Potential
Impact
of
Roadmap
Directives,
EUTOPIA
LAW
(June
3,
2014),
http://eutopialaw.com/2014/06/03/access-to-the-criminal-case-file-french-example-shows-potentialimpact-of-roadmap-directives [https://perma.cc/MC89-ZF2P].
164. Id.
165. Id.
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D. Evaluating the Implementation of ECtHR Decisions
To evaluate the success of these mechanisms in implementing the right
to counsel decision in Salduz, and more generally, we need to ask several
questions. First, did the state party to the case comply with the judgment?
And what does compliance entail? Do other states comply with the decisions
of the ECtHR? We find a mixed picture. Although Turkey adopted corrective
legislation, it is unclear whether it fully addresses the issues. Several other
member states have taken actions to implement Salduz, but the measures they
have adopted may not guarantee a right as robust as that envisioned by the
ECtHR. Finally, member states that do not respond may face no real
consequences.
1. Compliance with Salduz in Turkey
One measure of success focuses on the individual applicant, and
perhaps other similarly situated applicants from the same member state
Despite the adoption of corrective legislation in Turkey and sustained
attention from the ECtHR and the CoM, it remains unclear whether the
general problems brought to light in Salduz have been satisfactorily
addressed. The Salduz case was not an isolated incident. An anti-terror law
had denied the minor applicant the assistance of counsel during his
interrogation, and additional Turkish cases came to the ECtHR after Salduz
revealing systematic violations of the right to counsel. The ECtHR ordered
relief in these cases as well,166 and for purposes of implementation by the
CoM, these cases have been treated as a group. Turkey adopted legislative
changes repealing the law that had denied counsel to the applicant in Salduz
and providing more generally for pretrial assistance of counsel.167 The
Turkish government argued that this satisfied its obligations. However, the
Salduz group of cases remained under the supervision of the CoM. In 2012
and 2013, non-government organizations (“NGO”s) filed requests that the
cases be subject to enhanced supervision and that the Turkish Government
be required to provide additional information and undertake additional
activities.168 The NGOs noted that although Salduz had eventually been

166. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, FACTSHEET—POLICE ARREST AND ASSISTANCE OF A
LAWYER (Apr. 2015) (on file with author) (citing Turkish cases involving both juveniles and adults from
2009 and 2010 in which damages were awarded).
167. For a detailed description of the additional cases and the measures taken by Turkey, see Kerem
Altıparmak, Implementation of the Judgment of Salduz/Turkey: Monitoring Report, HUMAN RIGHTS
JOINT PLATFORM (Ayşegül Bahçıvan trans., July 2013), http://www.aihmiz.org.tr/files/06_
Salduz_Report_EN.pdf.
168. Id. at 8 (making recommendations and noting earlier Open Society Institute Justice Initiative’s
request that the Salduz cases be given enhanced supervision).
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granted a retrial,169 other defendants were not retried due to various
procedural issues, and in general the percentage of cases in which counsel
was actually provided was extremely low.170
2. Compliance with Salduz in Other Member States
Another measure of success is the implementation of ECtHR decisions
by other states. Again, the picture is mixed. A case brief for the Open Society
Justice Initiative expressed optimism in 2011, describing a “Salduz Fever
Sweep[ing] Europe” and stating that the Salduz reforms “are finally taking
hold.”171 National courts and prosecutorial authorities have taken action to
implement Salduz. In Belgium, where Attorneys General and the police
originally resisted efforts to provide indigent defendants with attorneys
during interrogations, the legislature passed the so-called “Salduz bill,”
which gave defendants the right to an attorney at the initial stages of police
proceedings. Scotland initially seemed resistant to the idea of implementing
the ECtHR’s judgment, but after being “slammed” by the UK Supreme
Court, it passed emergency legislation guaranteeing the right to counsel.172
France’s Cour de Cassation ruled that the ECtHR’s decision in Salduz
required legislation allowing attorneys to be present during interrogations to
go into effect immediately.173
However, it is important to note that the legislation other states passed
in response to Salduz did not necessarily guarantee a right to counsel as
robust as the one the ECtHR might have envisioned. In France, as discussed
above, post-Salduz legislation gave attorneys the right to be present at
interrogations but not to ask questions or see documents related to the
suspect’s arrest.174 In Scotland, suspects may now consult a state-paid
attorney prior to interrogation, but the vast majority of such consultations
take place over the phone, without the attorney ever coming to the station
169. In Salduz, four judges concurred to express concern about the relief to be afforded. Although
paragraph 72 of the ECtHR’s judgment stated that the “most appropriate form of redress for a violation
of Article 6 § 1 would be to ensure that the applicant, as far as possible, is put in the position in which he
would have been had this provision not been disregarded,” the concurring judges expressed concern that
this statement was not included in the operative portion of the judgment, which ordered Turkey to pay
the applicant €2,000 in damages and €1,000 in costs. Salduz v. Turkey, 2008-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 59, 81, 85–
88.
170. It is estimated that only 10 percent of criminal defendants in Turkey exercise their right to legal
assistance. See Altıparmak, supra note 167, at 12.
171. Marion Isobel, Case Watch: Salduz Fever Sweeps Europe, OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS (Apr.
26, 2011), http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/case-watch-salduz-fever-sweeps-europe
[https://perma.cc/G5SF-53V4].
172. See Ed Cape & Jacqueline Hodgson, The Right to Access to a Lawyer at Police Stations:
Making the European Directive Work in Practice, 5 NEW J. EUR. CRIM. L. 450, 453 (2014).
173. Id. at 453–54.
174. See Finelle & Tinsley, supra note 163.
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house.175 In France and the Netherlands, attorneys are limited to thirtyminute consultations with suspects before interrogations begin.176
It is uncertain whether these limited extensions of the right to counsel
will be deemed sufficient by the ECtHR. Even if they are deemed
insufficient, it is unclear what consequences, if any, will await states that do
not comply with the Court’s judgments. Ultimately, implementation of the
ECtHR’s judgments relies on what Ed Bates calls “the political ‘peer’
pressure that the Committee [of Ministers], and so the Convention system
more generally, may exert.”177 In effect, the Strasbourg system depends on
“the good will and cooperation of the States themselves.”178
There appear to be limits to what good will and peer pressure can
accomplish. The UK, for example, has steadfastly refused to comply with an
ECtHR ruling that convicted prisoners may not be disenfranchised.179
Despite the enforcement mechanisms described above, to date there have
been no real consequences for this refusal. Indeed, instead of the Council of
Europe threatening to expel the UK from the European body, leaders in the
UK who are concerned about national sovereignty and democratic control
have called for the UK to withdraw from the Convention and the jurisdiction
of the ECtHR.180
The UK’s experience indicates that states that have not responded to
Salduz by guaranteeing a meaningful right to counsel during interrogation
may never face real consequences for their failure to comply. Thus, despite
the many layers of “enforcement” developed by the Council of Europe, the
lack of stiff penalties for states that don’t comply with ECtHR judgments
may render the Council incapable of ensuring that every European defendant
has access to an attorney during interrogation.
3. The Limitations of the Strasbourg System
Although it appears that the Strasbourg system has advantages over the
U.S. system, it is unclear whether its advantages are sufficient to support the
emergence of a fully-matured right to counsel. The Strasbourg supervisory
system certainly has some elements that are lacking in the U.S. system. For
175. See Cape & Hodgson, supra note 172, at 462.
176. See id.
177. BATES, THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 141,
at 493.
178. Id.
179. See Bates, THE UK AND STRASBOURG: A STRAINED RELATIONSHIP, supra note 118, at 1–2.
180. See Nicholas Watt & Owen Bowcott, Tories Plan to Withdraw UK from European Convention
on Human Rights, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/
2014/oct/03/tories-plan-uk-withdrawal-european-convention-on-human-rights [https://perma.cc/FPK79X87].
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example, the Strasbourg system has developed an administrative and judicial
regime for ordering general remedies and supervising their implementation.
But the Strasbourg system has not yet demonstrated that it can ensure that
counsel will be provided in member states at all designated stages of a
criminal case. And it has not undertaken or been tested in cases involving the
more nuanced question whether counsel was adequate. Moreover, there are
danger signals on the horizon. Even with its new administrative procedures,
the Court’s caseload is unmanageable,181 the rates of compliance with its
decisions appear to be declining,182 the Court’s legitimacy has been seriously
challenged, and a few member states are seriously considering whether to
exit.183
CONCLUSION
Both the U.S. and Strasbourg systems charge a high court with defining
and enforcing the right to counsel in criminal proceedings. But there are
major differences in the founding documents, institutional design, and
historical development of the right to counsel in the two systems. Each
system has distinctive advantages and limitations.
The more recent and specialized Strasbourg system has several
advantages that hold promise for enforcing a robust right to counsel for
indigent defendants. First, unlike the U.S. Constitution, the Strasbourg
system was designed to implement human rights, including the right to
counsel. The European Convention on Human Rights explicitly stated the
right to state-funded counsel, created a court to interpret and enforce that
right (as well as others created by the Convention), and provided a
framework for the enforcement of the court’s judgments. Member states
voluntarily accepted the mandate to fund the right to counsel under the
supervision of the ECtHR. Second, the delegation of enforcement authority
to the CoM provides political and diplomatic mechanisms to induce member
states to comply with ECtHR judgments. Third, the CoM and Secretariat
have developed a system of administrative procedures that bring pressure to
bear on recalcitrant member states. Finally, ECtHR judgments now
frequently order member states to develop general remedies as well as
remedies for the individual party before it, and these general remedies are
subject to administrative follow-up by the Secretariat and the CoM.

181. For the most recent caseload statistics and a discussion of their implications, see EUR. CT. H.R.,
ANNUAL REPORT 2015 (provisional version) 65 (69,900 applications pending at the end of 2014);
Madsen, supra note 36, at 177–78.
182. See Madsen, supra note 36, at 172.
183. See id. at 170–73 (discussing Russia and UK).
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But the ECtHR’s structure also imposes significant limitations. First,
the Convention created only a single court, with no possibility of adding
lower human rights courts. A European defendant must bring his case in
Strasbourg, where the ECtHR—even after the adoption of reforms such as
the pilot judgment system—remains encumbered by an enormous caseload
and backlog. Moreover, each case is brought as a complaint against a
particular member state, not as a challenge to the legality of the defendant’s
conviction or detention. The ECtHR can declare that an individual’s rights
were violated, it can order the member state to compensate him, and it can
declare that the most effective relief would be retrial. But the ECtHR cannot
itself reverse the individual’s conviction or order his release. The Convention
itself provides no procedure for seeking class-wide relief184 or structural
reform, and serious questions have been raised about the legitimacy of the
ECtHR’s requirement that member states adopt general remedies subject to
the oversight of the Secretariat and CoM. Perhaps it is not surprising that the
rate of compliance with ECtHR judgments has declined. And finally, at the
end of the day, if bureaucratic, political, and diplomatic pressures are
insufficient to bring about compliance with an ECtHR judgment, there is no
remedy other than expulsion of a recalcitrant member state that refuses to
comply with either a general or a specific remedy.
The U.S. system has very different advantages and limitations. It was
not originally designed for this purpose, but the U.S. constitutional system
evolved, over time, to provide a basis for judicial decisions creating and
enforcing individual rights, including the right to counsel, in state
prosecutions. The original constitutional design contained two features—
neither of which is present in the Strasbourg system—that later proved to be
critical to the enforcement of individual rights in state criminal prosecutions:
congressional authority to create lower federal courts and judicial authority
to issue writs of habeas corpus. The Constitution was twice amended, first
by the Bill of Rights, which recognized a narrow right to counsel applicable
in federal cases, and later, by the Civil War amendments, which required
Due Process in state proceedings. Eventually, the Supreme Court held that
Due Process includes the right to state-compensated counsel. Taken together,
these developments created a system that affords significant advantages to
individual defendants. Unlike a defendant in a European country, who must
184. For a discussion of the ECtHR’s lack of a class action mechanism and the limitations of the
pilot-judgment mechanism as a substitute, see generally Tatiana Sainati, Human Rights Class Actions:
Rethinking the Pilot-Judgment Procedure at the European Court of Human Rights, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J.
147 (2015). Sainati observes that “the legal basis for the pilot-judgment procedure remains contested; the
rules and procedures governing the pilot-judgment mechanism lack clarity and predictability; and . . .
[they lack the] procedural safeguards necessary” to protect individual rights. Id. at 149–50.
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bring a case in Strasbourg, an individual defendant in the United States has
two options. He may seek review of a state conviction by the Supreme Court
as the final step in the appellate process in his original criminal case, though
such review is granted in only a tiny fraction of cases. But an individual
defendant can also challenge his state conviction by bringing a habeas action
in the local federal district court where he is incarcerated. Those courts can
order the relief that an individual most values, reversing his conviction or
ordering his retrial or release. In addition, the federal courts also have
jurisdiction to entertain class actions and actions seeking injunctive relief.
Unfortunately, the structural advantages of the U.S. system have been
largely nullified by judicial decisions that have narrowed the scope of habeas
review, restricted institutional reform litigation, and failed to put any teeth
in the definition of constitutionally adequate representation. The lower
federal courts provide a forum for constitutional litigation, but neither habeas
nor structural reform litigation has been able to make a federal right to the
effective assistance of counsel a reality in state prosecutions. The U.S.
Constitution does not guarantee a truly effective right to counsel in state
proceedings.
At a sufficient level of abstraction, the commitment to the right to
counsel seems easy to make, and easy to defend. Trials involve complex
procedural matters, making it nearly impossible for defendants to adequately
represent themselves. In order to provide a fair and just trial, each criminal
defendant should have a lawyer, even if he or she is too poor to pay for one.
Those lawyers should protect the fundamental rights of all citizens and
prevent wrongful convictions, but should not unduly interfere with the
accurate determination of guilt. But in practice, questions arise that are
harder to answer. Defense lawyers are expensive, in treasure, time, and the
potential for lost convictions of the factually guilty. They are therefore
politically controversial. Moreover, determining how these rights are best
implemented across varied jurisdictions is difficult for appellate courts.
Under both the Constitution and the Convention a central court bears
the responsibility of ensuring that the right to counsel is honored. Neither
system has fully answered the difficult questions of detail. For example, the
binary question—did you have a lawyer?—is more readily susceptible to
judicial decision making by a central reviewing court than are the more
complex questions—was a lawyer necessary at a particular stage for the
decision to be fair or reliable, and was the particular lawyer you actually got
effective under the circumstances? And neither system has demonstrated that
the judiciary can create money or political will. Like many difficult political
problems, defining and enforcing the right to counsel has been resistant to a
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variety of solutions. In both systems, therefore, the evolution of the right
remains a work in progress.

